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Abstract  
American competition policy is based on three normative acts: The Sherman Act, The 
Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act, even though they will see many 
amendments and different interpretations with time. Competition regulation has 
evolved through the decisions of the American Courts of Justice through which the 
legislation was interpreted, as well as a result of the priorities and directorial paths of the 
implementing agencies.  
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1. Introduction  
The international leader in the evolution of competition regulation is the USA, the first to create 
and implement laws in this field. A public policy regarding competition appeared in the US at the 
end of the 19th century, as a reaction to the economic concentrations which existed in the American 
economy.  
 
The first American competition legislation adopted at a federal level, The Sherman Act of 1890, 
appeared in a special historical context, that of a period characterized by an increasing number of 
industrial concentrations or trusts in different sectors, such as oil, metalworking or the electricity 
industry, processing industries of meat, sugar, lead, tobacco and gunpowder and on the backdrop 
of the severe economic depression throughout the 1880s [7,8]. Thus, the farmers' organizations, 
syndicates, as well as the smaller entrepreneurs united to promote a law to protect them from the 
economic power of these new trusts. There are two important sections of the Sherman Act. Section 
1 forbids the contracts, combinations and conspiracies to restrict trade between federal states or 
with tertiary states. Section 2 interdicts monopolizing or the attempts and combinations intended 
to monopolize any part of the commerce between states, and tertiary states. The penalties for those 
who break the law can be prison and/or fines. In order to supervise and apply the Sherman law, 
an implementing agency was created, the Antitrust Division of the American Justice Department10. 
This division investigates the severe infringements of competition laws which may lead to the 
issuing of severe fines and even jail time sentencing for the accused, should legal action be taken.  
 
2. Fines and penalties for competition in the US after 1999 
An essential question is whether the potential threatening of companies and individuals with federal 
penal fines and private lawsuits for damages is the most powerful means of deterring trusts? According to 
studies by Block, Nold and Sidak11, the main conclusion is that this threat is the main deterrent for the 
creation of trusts, therefore, lately, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice tried to 
consolidate this deterrent through the imposing of larger fines for corporations that fix prices and 
                                                 
10 The Antitrust Division of the American Justice Department has the following website: www.usdoj.gov/atr/ 
11 Block, M.K., Nold, F.C., Sidak, J.G. (1981) , „The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement”, Journal of Political Economy 
89, June, pp.429-45. Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  
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through extending the clemency program for companies which unveil the role they played in a 
conspiracy and cooperate with the government.  Thus, after 1994, infringements to the Sherman act 
have led to penal fines of at least 10 million dollars for each case and 11 fines of at least 100 million 
per case. The biggest fine, of 500 million dollars, was served to the F. Hoffmann-La Roche firm. 
(Table 1)  
 
Table 1. Fines of over 100 million dollars levied by the American Justice Department, 
Antitrust Division 
 
Year 
 
Incriminated Company  Type of activity 
Value of the fine 
(millions of dollars) 
1996  Archer Daniels Midland Co.  Citric acid and lysine  100 
1998  UCAR International, Inc.  Graphite electrolytes   110 
1999  SGL Carbon AG   Graphite electrolytes  135 
1999 BASF  AG  Vitamins  225 
1999  F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd.   Vitamins  500 
2001  Mitsubishi Corp.  Graphite electrolytes  134 
2004 Infineon  Technologies  AG  Semiconductors  160 
2005 Hynix  Semiconductor,  Inc.  Semiconductors  185 
2006  Samsung Electronics Company, Ltd.; 
Samsung Semiconductor, Inc. 
Semiconductors 300 
2007  British Airways  Air transport  300 
2007  Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd.  Air transport  300 
 
The deputy assistant to the Minister of Justice, responsible with the penal implementation of 
competition legislation, Scott Hammond, in “Recent Developments, Trends, and Milestones in the 
Antitrust Division’s criminal Enforcement Program”12,  references the jail penalty enforced on the 
individuals who broke competition legislation, and in 2007, 87% of the accused in the lawsuits filed 
by the Antitrust Division of the American Department of Justice have been sentenced to jail.   
Starting with the year 2000, more than 150 individuals have done prison time as a direct result of 
lawsuits filed by the Antitrust Division of the American Department of Justice. One may surmise 
that this criminal aspect of the behavior of individuals represents one of the characteristics of the 
American model of applying competition policy, both conventionally, through fines, as well as 
penal, through imposing detention terms (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Investigations initiated by the Department of Justice 
 
Investigations 
initiated 
1999  2000  2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Sherman cap.1- 
trade restraining 
74 85 84 95  137  79  118  104  77  76 
Sherman cap.1- 
monopoly 
6 10  10  13  11  7 8 3 6 - 
 
Along with the Sherman Act of 1890, the fundamental legislation on which the antitrust policy is 
based is the Clayton Law13 the Federal Trade Commission Law14 (Federal Trade Commission –
FTC) of 1914 as well as the Robinson-Patman Law of 1936.  
 
The motivations for adopting the Sherman Law were preponderantly political, such as the aversion 
to the economic power of the "big businesses" and the desire of the political factor to protect small 
                                                 
12 Speech available atwww.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/232716.pdf 
13 The Clayton Act is available at: www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanual/ch2.htm#a1 
14 The Federal Trade Commission Act is available at: WWW.law.cornell.edu/uscode/15/ Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  
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business against which the big trusts would compete and which they would abuse15. An extreme 
activism of US policy in the field of competition manifested in the 60s, a period during which 
horizontal concentrations which aim to obtain economies of scale are blocked precisely for this 
reason, in order to not eliminate from the market the less efficient competitors. The perspective of 
the authorities is modified radically though, starting with the later have of the 70s.  
 
3. New approaches in the US competition 
One of the fundamental theses of the new approach is constituted in promoting of the criteria of 
efficiency in the evaluation of the compatibility of business practices with the objectives of the 
competition legislation and not just by deeming them as being anti-competition. Thus, a business 
practice is qualified as pro-competition if it has as an effect the increase of the efficiency of resource 
allocation in the economy and, finally, an increase of consumer welfare16. In a practical sense 
however, this transition process is not instantaneous. If the efficiency criteria is mentioned in the 
Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice in 1968, it will not be completely adopted until 
1997, through the publication of a common document by the DoJ and the FTC, Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines). 
 
In fact, American competition policy is based on three acts: The Sherman Act, The Clayton Act and 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, even if these will see numerous amendments and 
interpretations in time. The Clayton Act has a much better delimited sphere of comprehension, 
defining more clearly the anti-competition acts and practices.  
 
Section 2 of this act forbids discrimination based on price within trade between a seller and 
different buyers of goods of the same category and quality.  
 
Section 3 declares as illegal for any person engaged in trade, within such a trade situation, the 
lending or selling of goods for the use or reselling within the United States, with the condition that 
the buyer not use or distribute the products of the seller's or lender's competitor.  
 
Section 6 excludes from the application of the law of competition the organizations of agriculture, 
horticulture and work, stipulating that these institutions are not to be treated as illegal 
combinations or conspiracies.  
 
Section 7 forbids the acquisitions of companies which may have as an effect the severe weakening 
of the competition or that tends to create a monopoly. The Clayton Act outlawed price 
discrimination, clauses and accords referring to exclusive deals, as well as mergers between 
competing companies. However, these practices were illegal only in the event in which they would 
substantially weaken the competition or would tend to create a monopoly. Section 7, which dealt 
with mergers, was inefficient, for the most part, because of the existence of a legal loophole. Later 
on, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1950 will add a new Section 7, demanding that certain 
acquisitions and mergers be notified to the Federal Trade Commission as well as the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice.  
 
Section 8 of the Clayton act forbids any person to hold a position of director within two or more 
corporations which are or have been competitors on any market, when one of these corporations 
holds actives in excess of 1 million dollars.  
 
                                                 
15 The Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) case, instrumented by the American antitrust authorities in 1945, is 
suggestive to this effect: "there is no exclusion of competitors more efficient by the respective company, than to follow 
progressively any new opportunity which appears on the market and to meet any new competitors with a production 
capacity in reserve at the disposal of a large organization which enjoys the advantage of experience, well established 
business connections and elite personnel".  
The investigations of large companies, such as American Telephone & Telegraph and International Businesses Machine, are 
closed in this period, and the attitude towards vertical deals (producer-distributor) and concentrations (especially 
horizontal ones, between competitors) becomes more favorable.   Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  
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The Federal Trade Commission Act stipulates substantial antitrust provisions in Sections 5 and 12, 
and in Section 8, a special agency is created (The Federal Trade Commission) holding both 
investigative duties as well as legal ones. The Federal Trade Commission is an administrative 
authority with a certain degree of independence, as opposed to the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice which represents, in fact, executive power. The competences are imparted as 
follows: The Federal Trade Commission ensures that the interdictions of the Clayton Act and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act are respected, while the Department of Justice ensures the 
application of the Sherman Act, being the only body with the ability to issue penal fines. Therefore, 
civil and penal actions are brought to court by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, 
and the civil implementations and interest-injury actions against persons are brought to court by 
the Federal Trade Commission.  
 
A recent case of the implementation of antitrust legislation, considered a success, is the one 
regarding the vitamins producers cartel (the cases of 199 SAU c.F.Hoffman-La Roche and USA c.BASF 
AG). At the end of the 90s, the Antitrust Division began an investigation of a cartel of vitamins 
producers which affected over 5 billion dollars of American trade. The evidence showed that the 
members of the cartel had reached detailed accords regarding the quantities that each company 
should produce, the prices they should set, as well as the clients to whom they should deliver their 
products. The ones who had the most to suffer from buying the products from the members of the 
cartel were important brands such as General Mills, Kellogg, Coca-Cola, Tyson Food and Procter & 
Gamble, as well as American consumers. This investigation led to the indictment of American, 
Swiss, German, Canadian and Japanese companies and to the jail sentencing of a number of 
managers. The members of the cartels were fined for an excess of 850 million dollars, including a 
record-breaking fine of 500 million dollars given to Hoffman La Roche and a 225 million dollar fine 
for BASF AG17. 
 
Another recent case, this time of investigation of possible infringements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Act, was that of Google/DoubleClick from 2008. In December 2007, the Federal Trade Commission 
announced that it will not attempt to block the acquisition of the Double Click internet publicity 
server by Google INC. The reasoning invoked referred to the fact that Google and Double Click 
were not direct competitors on any relevant competition market. Even so, in order to respond to 
the concerns regarding the confidentiality of certain data regarding consumers, the Federal Trade 
Commission proposed that the two firms respect certain principles regarding confidentiality for 
online publicity and demanded commentaries for the interested parties18. A subject of recurrent 
debates in American society, was the dual character of the American implementation system. 
Critiques referred the useless duplication which may lead to the inconstancy of competition 
policies, additional administrative burdens on companies, or other obstacles in the path of correct 
implementation in the field of federal competition. Some have proposed an entire redistribution of 
responsibility of implementations towards the Federal Trade Commission, and others suggested 
the elimination of the Federal Trade Commission altogether, the Department of Justice covering the 
legal actions referring only to the infringements of the Sherman Act. The American Congress, on 
the basis of a piece of legislation promulgated in 2002, constituted the Commission for 
Modernizing Competition Legislation which was active until May 31st, 2007. This Commission had 
the stated mission to examine the necessity for the modernization of competition legislation and to 
identify and study connected aspects, to seek feedback from all sides implicated in the operation of 
the competition laws, as well as to evaluate the appropriateness of the current arrangements and 
proposals regarding the aspects defined prior. At the end of the term, in 2007, the Commission for 
Modernizing Competition Legislation, underlined in its Report19  addressed to the Congress and 
the President, that it doesn't recommend any institutional change in the current American dual 
system of implementation of competition legislation. 
                                                 
17 Rapport The FTC in 2008: A Force for Consumers and Competition,  available at: http://www.ftc.gov/bc/ 
anncompreports.shtm, p.4 
18 Rapport The FTC in 2008: A Force for Consumers and Competition, p.27 
19 The rapport of the Competition Legislation monitoring commission, chapter 2, 2007, p.129  Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  
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In the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, which reformed and consolidated the Clayton Act, the 
American Congress supported the control of mergers by forbidding the consolidation of actives 
and stocks which did not lead to a dominant position. There is a system of pre-notification of 
mergers, at the basis of the Consolidated Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976, of Section 13 (b) of the 
Federal Trade Commission and of Section 15 of the Clayton Act, which allows the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice to protect competition 
through the identification and investigation of those mergers and acquisitions which raise 
important concerns from a competitive point of view. In 2008, 1,726 transactions have been 
reported, which represents a 22% decrease from 2007. One of the most significant cases managed 
by the Federal Trade Commission was the one between the already established merger between 
Polypore International and Microporous Products, in which the Federal Trade Commission 
established the fact that the acquisition made in February of 2008 led to the decrease of competition 
and the rise of prices on markets of different types of battery separations films used in battery 
generators. Also in 200820, The Federal Trade Commission blocked the merger proposed between 
Inova Health System Foundation and Prince William Health System, which had prejudiced 
competition in North Virginia, on the health services for chronic diseases provided by the hospitals 
market. According to the annual Hart –Scott-Rodino report, in 2008, the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice analyzed 16 merger transactions and concluded that, in case they had been 
permitted to take place, the effect would have been competition loss, and 15 of them were settled 
out of court. A recent case is USA c.AT&T Inc. and Dobson Communications Corporation, for 
which the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice analyzed the proposed acquisition, 
valued at 2.8 billion dollars of Dobson Communications by AT&T. The Division considered that, in 
case the respective transaction had taken place, it would have led to substantial competition loss, to 
the detriment of the rural consumers of non-cable telecommunication services on seven markets in 
Kentucky, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma and Texas. This, in turn, would have led to increased 
prices, inferior quality and decreased investments for the upgrading of the grid. More precisely, in 
these areas, the companies which were completely or partially the property of AT&T and Dobson 
offered services to more than 60% of subscribers, and on two of the markets, where the main 
competitor of AT&T also operated on a Cellular One license of Dobson, AT&T would not have 
been stimulated and would not have had the capacity to  contact competition through limiting the 
licenser from using the Cellular One brand efficiently. This case was brought to court in May 2008. 
With regards to the activity of the Federal Trade Commission, in 2008 there were 21 transactions 
for which the Commission considered that competition loss was possible in case they took place, 
sending just as many orders. According to these opinions of the Commission, the parts needed to 
either abandon the deals, or modify them after receiving the information.  
 
In the case of The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc./Pathmark Stores Inc, The Federal 
Trade Commission analyzed the acquisition proposed to Pathmark Stores by A&P, with a value of 
1.3 billion dollars which would have led to a substantial loss of competition between the two 
supermarket companies in State Island and Long Island, New York. A&P operates 316 
supermarkets in 5 states in the regions on the Atlantic Coast and north-eastern USA, as well as in 
the District of Columbia. Pathmark operates 141 supermarkets in four states. According to the 
complaint filed by the FTC to a court of law, the proposed deal would have allowed A&P to 
exercise more power in the market and raise prices for different foodstuffs, which would have led 
to a similar behavior from the operators in Staten Island and Long Island, which would have 
interacted coordinately. In order to remedy these concerns, the FTC issued an order through which 
it demanded that A&P sell six supermarket locations from the very concentrated markets of New 
York.  
 
4. Important features of the American model competition 
The American federal model is essentially an investigative one, in the way that the focus is on ex 
post application. Such an application has, essentially, a punitive and character and a discouraging 
                                                 
20 The annual Hart –Scott-Rodino report for 2008, Section 7A, p.1-2. Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  
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effect of similar behavior in the future. As fundamental attributes, the American competition policy 
is characterized by:  
  the criminalization of individuals' behavior: even though companies are the ones which 
indulge in different anti-competition practices and the result of those practices is found, in the 
end, in their profit and loss accounts, the individuals are really the ones making the decisions. 
The anti-competition practices of the companies are started by individuals from their 
leadership, who have the ability to modify the competition behavior of the respective entities. 
As a consequence, American competition legislation penalizes the individuals implicated in 
anti-competition practices as well, both through individual fines as well as in a penal manner, 
through imposing detention terms (starting with 1975, terms which may, presently, be as long 
as 5 years);  
  the private application of competition legislation: In the US, any part which is affected by an 
anti-competition practice qualified as illegal by a decision of public authorities may initiate a 
process of obtaining damages from the company in question. The principle of damages 
calculation which may be obtained is that these may be up to three times the damages 
effectively sustained. This principle is applied not only in the case of large companies, which 
have the ability to initiate on their own such a process, but also by the consumers from the 
public, law firms awarding themselves the possibility to automatically represent their interests. 
One of the factors which may explain such an approach is that the Antirust Office - the 
principal organ of the public administration which is invested with the application of 
competition legislation - is a division within the Department of Justice. Initially, the Division 
benefited from a significant transfer of competences and human resources from the 
Department of Justice, which may have explained some of the characteristics of the application 
process. Later on, though, economists have taken the place of jurists as the majority of the 
division's employees.  
 
5. Conclusions  
In the context of the global economic crisis which began in 2007, the analysts of the American 
Antitrust Institute 21, considered that a series of institutional and legislative measures in the field of 
competition are suitable, proposals which have been brought before the American Congress in 
March of 2009. These regard, primarily, the creation of a deputy assistant of the minister of justice, 
within the Antitrust Division of the American Justice Department, whose appointment be 
approved by the Senate and whose mission to be to participate in the elaboration of national policy 
with an impact on competition. Secondly, annalists consider that there has to be kept in mind the 
initiation, by the American Congress, of a legislation which would allow the executive to stop the 
formation of new organizations which would be too big to fail and to facilitate a much faster 
decision making process regarding approval, by the President, of mergers within the system of 
their pre-notification.  
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